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Abstract
Intuitive Battle Dynamics concerns the understanding of time. The rapid changes in today’s
society give us less time for reflection and thinking. A commander needs to develop sensitivity
to the changes in the battlefield to be able to control the situation. To find out what sensitivity is
needed and in a further perspective to be able to train command and control in dynamic
processes we have used microworlds, i.e., computer simulations of dynamic tasks. The aim is to
explore and develop the Commander’s need for intuitive battle dynamics, which we believe, is
essential for command and control in the future. This paper is about a concept of using
microworlds to study intuitive battle dynamics.
1. Introduction
A military commander must be able to function in environments characterised by high
uncertainty and time pressure. The concept of intuitive battle dynamics is a development of
strategic thinking for dynamic situations based on non-linear knowledge. The aim is to prepare
executives by improve their decision capacity in unknown situations, like chaos, crisis, and wars.
A better insight and understanding for the dynamics of the battle field will probably lead to less
uncertainty and better ability to exercise command and control. The central and critical
dimension in a dynamic process is time. If we can create a better understanding of, and feeling
for, time we can probably create a competitive advantage.
Most organisations work with a number of different time scales. At different organisational
levels the executive works in different time frames. There the duration gets longer between
action and detection of effects the higher up in the organisation. Executives at different
organisational levels have different spatial scales to consider, different levels of control are
needed to monitor these scales, which creates control problem of sheer magnitude. Concepts of
the different levels of warfare have changed over the years in response to advances in
technology, which today permit direct near real-time control over events. This has led to a form
of war in the twentieth century that is inordinately complex and depends on the extensiveness of
real-time command and control, which we had seen practised recently in the Bosnia conflict.
We argue that part of the problems when handling strategic time depends on the lack of adequate
methods. By quasi-experimental environments and the creation of microworlds, we found a
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The task to create microworlds for strategic decisions is a cognitive engineering task. We are
designing methods to support better cognitive functions, which requires supports both for the
cognitive process and the social process in the staff. This development of specifications must be
based on military analysis (e.g. Brehmer, 1998).
2. Time as an essential asset that we have problem to manage
Time has been shown to be an essential asset in management. We could in fact find that the main
interest of executives concerning time is being on time and speed. “We have the information in
the company, but we don’t seem to get it to right place in time“ or “We get information to the
right place, but we could not choose fast enough“
2 and “We are okay at choosing what to do, but
we are too damned slow. By the time we pull the trigger, the targets moved“ (Fuller, 1993).
These statements indicate the problem we face in management in the perspective of time.
Our studies have shown that executives normally talk about linear time measured by watches,
but if time is so simple, why do we have problems controlling it? Time is one of the most
complex dimensions in decision making and has be described as a source of fundamental
surprise (e.g. Lanir, 1991). Discussions of time are abstract, and we often relate the time to
specific events for making it more concrete. Studies have shown that it is differences between the
objective time of what we all agree on and the subjective time of what we believe. In the
processes of estimating events in the future we rely on our subjective time perspective (see
prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The differences between subjective and
objective time can explain some part of the problem with managing time. By synchronising them
we could become more effective.
Subjective time preferences are normally tacit and we need to make them explicit in order to be
able to manage time and communicate time perspectives with others. To be able to manage time
we need to be aware of the different time scales in the decision loop, such as the time between
decision and action, between action and result, result and a new picture of the situation, and the
time to make the decision. We have found in discussions with generals and executives in
business that it is problematic to concretely discuss those different time scales and that the
knowledge of the executives’ subjective time preferences is still tacit, which makes it
problematic to manage time in reality. We believe that part of the solution in managing dynamic
processes is to make the subjective time scales more obvious and by creating a better time
estimation of events in the future.
3. To handle time in a military operation
In history we found a great number of examples of the importance of an adequate understanding
of time for the success of a military operation. We will here review some of the main concepts of
how time has been used in the discussion of joint military operations
1.. Searching for speed – In the perspective of efficiency we often discovered attempts to make
things faster than the competitors, sometimes to unreasonable costs. There is an assumption
of optimisation and that it is a competitive advantage to act first. This assumption sometimes
meets criticism with arguments about harmony. Statements like Sun Tzu’s that the greatest
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2.. Time rulers of war – A common activity in staff procedures is to order activities along time
rulers in certain orders to achieve the goal of the fight. This is a creation of a map with
resources, geography and time. The starting points and deadlines normally give the
framework for the planning procedures. Recently we have followed the discussion of
command and control warfare that argued for breaking the enemy’s decision loop, with the
purpose to delay or paralyse his command and control system. We could here argue that this
concept is an attack on time rulers by creating uncertainty that delays decisions. Time rulers
are a key element for the Commanders to communicate their will on the battlefield.
3.. Timing – An example of timing is to gain time, which is to create situations that suit the
Commander. The Commander tries to win time by delaying the development of events. This
is a result of not being able to store time like other resources and that we need to control the
processes to create time for other activities. Local superiority by power projection in time is
another concept of timing, where a combination of forces is allocated to certain terrain in a
certain time frame (Clausewitz, 1991). Timing is also essential in concepts like asymmetric
warfare (see the concept of coping with the bounds Czerminski, 1998), manoeuvre warfare
(Lind, 1985), and surprise.
All examples point to the need for command and control in the relevant time scales in military
operations, and there are many different time scales on the battlefield. The time scales result
from the time constants for the activities on the battlefield, and they cause friction. We can see
friction as caused by delays of activities and feedback. We cannot assume that Commanders
could become aware of all important time scales on the battlefield, but if he could improve the
estimation of actual time constants by better an intuitive battle dynamics he would probably gain
a comparative advantage.
4. How can we understand time?
In the attempt to understand time, there are basically two ways: case studies and experiments.
The traditional way has been case studies, but a nation like Sweden has no own modern
experiences in joint military. Military joint operations have proved to be a complex issue and it is
not obvious that international experiences can be transformed to Swedish circumstances. We
need to find other ways by using experiments to collect data. Earlier work has shown that
simulation is an important tool in the analysis and modelling of complex work domains in
combination with actual field studies. There is reciprocal and continuous relationship between
field studies by means of simulations (Brehmer, Leplat and Rasmussen, 1991).
We have also found that few international case studies focused their attention on the problems of
time. Most reports discuss the time perspective in terms of friction of the battlefield where delays
are seen the result of dysfunctional systems. By transforming the insights from case studies into
dynamic models, we are forced to make the time scale explicit. We, therefore, believe that it is
necessary to use experiments with models in order to create a better understanding of time. The
model will not necessarily give us the right time scales, but it helps us to think in time scales and
consequences of its existence. The models will represent how we see different time scales and
the relation between different scales.5. In strategic war-games time is not the focus
In military issues there is a long tradition of using war-games to create decision support or to
train officers. In these games the three geographical dimensions have been of central interest and
time is taken for granted. The games can be run as open, i.e., all participants knows everything,
or as closed games where you only know your own view. The games can be event-driven, or
clock-driven.. The event-driven games are built on causality and activity, and results follow a
rulebook. In clock-driven games there is a time ruler with all activities in order to be executed at
the specific time and they are not dependent on the opposite forces activities.
In strategic games there is the problem of playing in real-time, because of the long time duration
of the activities. To solve that problem, a game time is created. Normally the game is run in
sequences in which events are played in environments where time stands still. After necessary
decisions are made, the game jumps to the next time frame of interest. This assumes that there is
no time pressure in strategic issues and that we have the time we need to make decisions and that
there is no new essential information addition when we are making that decision. Both
assumptions are highly unbelievable and risk giving a distorted view of reality.
In war-games the time scale is essential, but still very little emphasis is put on time management
in strategic games. If we want to create an intuition of battle dynamic, more emphasis is needed
to describe the time scales in the game. We believe that what we can learn is the relative time
between two activities and thereby create strategic time awareness. Better awareness of time
scales could give Commanders a better control of the dynamic processes.
6. To create Intuitive Battle Dynamics
There is no agreement yet about what the definition for intuitive battle dynamics should be.
There is more of a hypothesis regarding what the characteristics could be like. We see intuitive
battle dynamics as the tacit knowledge that helps the commander to handle dynamics in battle. It
is a Commander’s ability to see the dynamics of a situation and get the opportunity to predict the
course of events.
We learn from Molke (in Simpkin, 1985) that there are two different forms of decisions; one
before contact with the enemy and one after contact. We can describe these two forms in terms
of planning before and accomplishment in contact. Before contact with the enemy we live in a
dream where we believe that we can control the enemy by the plan, a process that in many ways
can be seen as static. When we enter into combat we turn into a feedback relation where the plan
in some aspect will be abandoned. This does not mean that plans are useless in combat, but we
need a measure of openness to work outside the plan. “An officer’s principal weapon is his
mind“ (US Marine Corps) and we need to act with emotion and intuition. This conclusion leads
us to believe that there are two different contextual time perspectives in battles that Commanders
need to be able to handle.
Enrico Quarantelli (in Lagadec, 1993) explained, with a military battle experiences metaphor,
that an actor generally only has a limited amount of experience from which he or she will try to
make generalisations. He said that military strategy is based not on war memories but on
systematic analysis of the situation We can all think of interesting anecdotes, but that is not theway you learn how to win wars. Subjective experiences from one point of view only are not
necessarily representative of the organisation as a whole.
To succeed in a combat environment Commanders need to have situation awareness. This picture
has four main dimensions, where three are descriptions of space and one describes temporal
relations. To create the executive picture of the situation we then plot all information in those
dimensions to create a map. Fuller (1993) points out that it is essential that all information be
plotted in the same map to create holistic over views. This map is normally a static
representation of the actual situation, delayed by friction in the system. It is already a historical
picture, since "The best way to predict the future is to invent it" or as William Gibbson stated
"The future is already here but you are not able to see it yet" (Hammill, 1999)
To enter into a pro-active situation we need to create pictures of the future. Researchers today
have shown that there are signs of changes that could signal what will happen (Bond, 1997). The
problem we face here is to see these signs and react. Many times there are at first no visible
logical reasons so the judgement has to be made on other bases than rationality.
An important part of intuitive battle dynamics is to create conceptual pictures of the future based
on the signs in actual situations and to formulate problems for the future. The conceptual pictures
make it possible to visualise complex problems that support the understanding for the situation.
Depending on the Commander’s problem solving approach, he will act differently to solve this
problem.
Microworlds
Microworlds are computer simulations designed for experimental purposes (see Brehmer &
Dörner, 1993, for a full discussion of microworlds and their use). In experiments with such
simulations, the subject is asked to interact with some system and to control its state for some
period of time. The system may require the subject to extinguish forest fires, govern a
developing country or a small town, or manage a factory (see Frensch & Funke, 1995, for
examples of microworlds). The microworlds are not full fidelity simulations. In designing such
simulations, it is important to avoid the “cat problem“, i.e., the problem that the best simulation
of a cat is another cat. However, the second cat will, of course, be as non-transparent and
complex as the first cat, and we would learn no more when using the second cat than the first.
Hence, microworlds must be simplified, and they are designed to relate to the systems that they
simulate in the same way as wood cuts relate to what they represent. That is, we can see what
they represent, and the essential relations and characteristics remain. Specifically, microworlds
are designed so that they have three important characteristics of real world decision tasks:
• complexity
• dynamics
• and in-transparency
In the present context, dynamics is the most important characteristic. It means exactly what it
means in physics, i.e., that we are simulating systems that have a memory and remember what
we have done to them. There is a subsequent response and therefore changes, This is a function,
both of the state of the microworld (as modified by earlier actions) and the current action.Additionally, time is important. This means, first that the decision maker has limited influence
over when he or she has to make decisions; they must be made when the state of the system
requires decisions, rather than when the decision maker feels good and is ready to make the
decisions. Second, considering time means that we have to realise that not only the system that
we set out to control, but also the means that we use for control, must be seen as processes. In
short, the essence of dynamic decision making can be seen as a question of finding a way to use
one process to control another process. This brings the various delays: dead time, time constants
and information delays to the fore, and the decision maker must be able to master the system
with its delays (Brehmer, 1995). Finally, taking time into consideration means that it is necessary
to consider all the relevant time scales in the task . In microworlds designed to help us study
commanders’ understanding of time, all these three aspects of dynamics must be included.
OpWar the first model
We had to create a mental acceptance for modelling and simulation, and develop a commitment
to developing models in the education program. In the autumn of 1998 we created a meta-model
named OpWar, operational war. This was the first model in what will subsequently become a
series of models. OpWar is a conceptual model that describes war on an abstract level and has
served as a demonstration and frame model in the education program at the National Defence
College. The aim was to show an example of what could be done in microworlds and to get
military officers attention paid to working with models in tools such as PowerSim® and
STELLA®.
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Studies with the simulation should be seen as  quasi-experiments in that we face a lack of control
of the individuals. What actually happens in the model and the interaction between the persons
and the model is logged, but how individuals reason and think is often hard to understand. In this
study we focus on what the strategist has on his mind in different time perspectives and his timeawareness. We do this by studying how he uses planning horizons and sees delays in his
activities. We are interested in his capability to have control in both retrospective and
prospective time frames. The bold components in the model above are the six variables that the
participants could affect in the simulation.
The subject can control the events by evaluating the six parameters of interest. Between each
time step in the simulation the participants could change the parameters. As support there are two
graphs; the total resources left, and the degree of control.
The microworld concept demands that we find the inner logic of the process. This logic is
created by dynamic models describing the key elements, their relations, and power. This model
gives the opportunity to study the rational part of processes. To study the irrational or non-
rational part we need to observe what goes on in the context of the model, for example between
participants in a group. Earlier studies have mainly focused on the result of the interaction with
the model, but to be able to study intuition, we need to obtain data pertaining to the non-rational
processes. Here, it is important to note that the interaction between participants and the
microworld involves much more than simply what gets executed in the computer model. Much
of the experience from running the model actually took place in the context of the model, and it
is hard to observe and interpret in many cases. All thoughts about power projections, staying
power etc take place in the mind of participants and it is necessary to make this explicit. As a
first step we used questionnaires to measure the attitudes to time and interviews to interpret the
results.
The prime results from running the model showed that we could not find any relations between
executive experience and time perceptions or capacity to handle time in the model. Still there are
indications that participants learn to handle the model, but it has not been shown that these
experiences help the executives in their daily life. We believe that by focusing on the problems
of time we create a consciousness for its existence and problems that participants later can
transform into their own reality.
The students reacted and responded to the model saying, “the model did not describe the reality
in practical terms“. Their task in class was now to create a sub-model to OpWar that better suited
their view of reality. The only directive they got was that there had to be a connection between
OpWar and their model, and that we were open to make changes in OpWar to support this
connection. Their work gave us representations of their actual knowledge of the operational
system. The models they create force them to show that they understand the circular causality of
the function they model. The work with OpWar is an ongoing project that helps us to continue
developing the knowledge of joint operational functions and issues.
Exercises to improve time perspectives could feed the development of microworlds at the same
time as we educate. When staff members are able to exchange and share the different types of
knowledge, a complementary and synergistic learning process occurs (e.g. Bennett III, 1998,
experiences of top-management team). Similar conclusions were found at the international peace
exercises at the National Defence College. Exercises were built on the basis of information from
experts from many different organisations who came and shared their knowledge. These
exercises have very little technical support today, and could probably be improved with the helpof supporting systems, for example to be a source of creating a knowledge database which can be
used for research and education. We assume that the experiences from the microworlds studies
can be useful for the development of the College educational programs.
7. Next step in the project?
We have in this study found that time is essential in the intuitive battle dynamics and that
Commanders put most effort in building situation awareness on historical data rather than in
creating forecasts. In the future we need to pay more attention to a structured way in futurology
that could create executive pictures of the situation that includes dynamics for future trends.
Focus has been on the design issue and further work has to be done on data collection and
analysis. We believe that we have found a suitable design technique for this task that has at least
five strong reasons to why we will continue using microworlds for studying the attitudes and
behaviour of Commanders.
a.. The creation of microworlds gives concrete pictures and representation of the field of
knowledge, which could have value in simulation with participants that, have documented
experiences.
b.. A system that continues creates a growing knowledge bank.
c.. Microworlds give opportunity to low cost flexible systems. We could easily try new angles
with greater investments.
d.. Models and parts of models could be transformed into decision support systems that give
dual use to the organisation.
e.. Microworlds give the opportunity to run tests internationally to find differences in concepts.
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